The Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) random key predistribution scheme has been widely recognized as a typical approach to secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, there is a lack of precise probability analysis on the reliable connectivity of WSNs under the EG scheme. To address this, we rigorously derive the asymptotically exact probability of k-connectivity in WSNs employing the EG scheme with unreliable links represented by independent on/off channels, where kconnectivity ensures that the network remains connected despite the failure of any (k − 1) sensors or links. Our analytical results are confirmed via numerical experiments, and they provide precise guidelines for the design of secure WSNs that exhibit a desired level of reliability against node and link failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) random key predistribution scheme [4] has been widely regarded as a typical solution to secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [12] , [15] . The scheme operates as follows. In a WSN with n sensors, before deployment, each sensor is independently assigned K n distinct keys which are selected uniformly at random from a pool of P n keys, where K n and P n are both functions of n. After deployment, any two sensors can securely communicate over an existing wireless link if and only if they share at least one key.
Wireless links between nodes may become unavailable due to the presence of physical barriers between nodes or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing transmission. We model unreliable links as independent channels, each being on with probability p n or being off with probability (1−p n ), where p n is a function of n for generality. Such on/off channel model has been used in the context of secure WSNs [9] , [15] , [12] , and is shown to well approximate the disk model [5] , [6] , [9] , [15] , [12] , where any two nodes need to be within a certain distance to establish a wireless link in between.
Given the randomness involved in the EG key predistribution scheme, and the unreliability of wireless links, there arises a basic question as to how one can adjust the EG scheme parameters K n and P n , and the link parameter p n , so that the resulting network is securely and reliably connected. Reliability against the failure of sensors or links is particularly important in WSN applications where sensors are deployed in hostile environments (e.g., battlefield surveillance), or, are unattended for long periods of time (e.g., environmental monitoring), or, are used in life-critical applications (e.g., patient monitoring). To answer the question above, this paper presents the asymptot-ically exact probability of k-connectivity in secure WSNs under the EG scheme with unreliable links. A network (or a graph) is said to be k-connected if it remains connected despite the deletion of any (k − 1) nodes or links. An equivalent definition is that each node can find at least k internally node-disjoint paths to any other node. With k = 1, k-connectivity simply means connectivity.
Our result on the asymptotically exact probability of kconnectivity complements a zero-one law established in our prior work [15] , [12] , and is significant to obtain a precise understanding of the connectivity behavior of secure WSNs. First, with the zero-one law, one is only provided with design choices which lead to networks that are k-connected with high probability or to that are not k-connected with high probability, where an event happens "with high probability" if its probability asymptotically converges to 1. Given the trade-offs involved between connectivity, security and memory load [4] , [9] , it would be more useful to have a complete picture by obtaining the asymptotically exact probability of kconnectivity. In addition, there may be situations where the network designer is interested in having a guaranteed level of k-connectivity (one-laws would provide conditions for that) but may also be interested in having some level of k-connectivity without such guarantees (one-laws would fall short in providing this). Our result fills this gap. Finally, it is not possible to determine the width of the phase transition from zero-one laws; the width of the phase transition is often calculated by the difference in parameters that it takes to increase the probability of k-connectivity from to (1 − ), for some < 0.5. In other words, it is not clear from zero-one laws how sensitive the probability of k-connectivity is to the variations in the EG scheme parameters K n and P n , and the link parameter p n . By providing the asymptotically exact probability of kconnectivity, our findings provide a clear picture of these intricate relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the system model in Section II. Section III presents the main results as Theorem 1, which is established in Section IV. In Section VI, we present numerical experiments that confirm our analytical findings. Afterwards, Section VII surveys related work, and Section VIII concludes the paper. The Appendix presents a few useful lemmas and their proofs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We now explain the system model. Consider a WSN with n sensors operating under the EG scheme and with wireless links modeled by independent on/off channels. Let a node set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } represent the n sensors. According to the EG scheme, each node v i ∈ V is independently assigned a set (denoted by S i ) of K n distinct cryptographic keys, which are selected uniformly at random from a key pool of P n keys. Any pair of nodes can then secure an existing communication link as long as they have at least one key in common.
The EG scheme results in a random key graph [1] , [7] , [10] , also known as a uniform random intersection graph. This graph denoted by G(n, K n , P n ) is defined on the node set V such that any two distinct nodes v i and v j have an edge in between, an event denoted by Γ ij , if and only if they share at least one key. Thus, the event Γ ij means S i ∩ S j = ∅ .
Under the on/off channel model for unreliable links, each wireless link is independently being on with probability p n or being off with probability (1 − p n ). Defining C ij as the event that the channel between v i and v j is on, we have P [C ij ] = p n , with P[A] throughout the paper meaning the probability that event A happens. The on/off channel model induces an Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ) [2] defined on the node set V such that v i and v j have an edge in between if C ij takes place.
Finally, we denote by G(n, K n , P n , p n ) the underlying graph of the n-node WSN under the EG scheme with unreliable links. We often write G rather than G(n, K n , P n , p n ) for brevity. Graph G is defined on the node set V such that there exists an edge between nodes v i and v j if events Γ ij and C ij happen at the same time. We set event E ij := Γ ij ∩ C ij and also write E ij as E vivj when necessary. It is clear that G is the intersection of G(n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ); i.e., G = G(n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n ).
(1) We define s n as the probability that two distinct nodes share at least one key and q n as the probability that two distinct nodes have an edge in between in graph G. Clearly, s n and q n both depend on K n and P n , while q n depends also on p n . As shown in previous work [1] , [7] , [10] , s n is determined through
if P n ≤ 2K n . Then by the independence of C ij and Γ ij , we have
III. THE MAIN RESULTS
We present the main results below. Throughout the paper, k is a positive integer and does not scale with n, and e is the base of the natural logarithm function, ln. We use the standard asymptotic notation o(·), O(·), ω(·), Ω(·), Θ(·) and ∼; in particular, for two positive sequences a n and b n , the relation a n ∼ b n means lim n→∞ a n /b n = 1.
Theorem 1. For graph G(n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n) and Kn Pn = o(1), with q n denoting the edge probability and a sequence α n defined through q n = ln n + (k − 1) ln ln n + α n n ,
if lim n→∞ α n = α * ∈ (−∞, ∞), then as n → ∞,
Theorem 1 provides the asymptotically exact probability of k-connectivity in graph G. Its proof is given in the next section. From (3), for all n sufficiently large, under P n > 2K n which is clearly implied by the condition Kn Pn = o(1), the edge probability q n in graph G is given by the expression p n · 1 − Pn−Kn Kn Pn Kn . With a much simpler approximation p n · Kn 2 Pn for q n , we present below a corollary of Theorem 1. Corollary 1. For graph G(n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o 1 ln n , with a sequence β n defined through p n · Kn 2 Pn = ln n + (k − 1) ln ln n + β n n ,
if lim n→∞ β n = β * ∈ (−∞, ∞), then as n → ∞,
Setting p n = 1 in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain the corresponding results for random key graph G(n, K n , P n ) in view of (1). Furthermore, we can use monotonicity arguments [15] to derive the zero-one laws for k-connectivity in graph G. Specifically, under the conditions of Theorem 1 (resp., Corollary 1), graph G is k-connected with high probability if lim n→∞ α n = ∞ (resp., lim n→∞ β n = ∞), and is not kconnected with high probability if lim n→∞ α n = −∞ (resp., lim n→∞ β n = −∞). The arguments are straightforward from our work [15] and are omitted here due to space limitation.
Before establishing Corollary 1 using Theorem 1, we explain the practicality of the conditions in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1: P n = Ω(n), Kn Pn = o(1) and Kn 2 Pn = o 1 ln n . First, the condition P n = Ω(n) indicates that the key pool size P n should grow at least linearly with n, which holds in practice [4] , [10] , [9] . Second, the condtions Kn Pn = o(1) and Kn 2 Pn = o 1 ln n (note that the latter implies the former) are also practical in secure sensor network applications since P n is expected to be several orders of magnitude larger than K n [4] , [10] , [9] .
We now prove Corollary 1 using Theorem 1. We have the conditions of Corollary 1: P n = Ω(n), Kn 2 Pn = o 1 ln n , and (5) with lim n→∞ β n = β * ∈ (−∞, ∞). First, it is clear that
Lemma 8], it holds that s n = Kn 2 Pn · 1 ± O Kn 2
Pn
. In view of the above, we obtain from (2) and (5) that
With α n defined by (4), we use (6) to derive α n = β * ± o(1), which yields that α * denoting lim n→∞ α n equals β * . Then in view of α * = β * and that the conditions of Theorem 1 all hold given the conditions of Corollary 1 (note that Kn 2 Pn = o 1 ln n implies Kn Pn = o(1)), Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1.
IV. ESTABLISHING THEOREM 1
For any graph, k-connectivity implies that its minimum degree is at least k, while the other way does not hold since a graph may have isolated components, each of which is k-connected within itself. However, for random graph G(n, K n , P n , p n ), as given by Lemma 1 below, we have shown it is unlikely under certain conditions that G(n, K n , P n , p n ) is not k-connected but has a minimum degree at least k.
Lemma 1 ([15, Section IX]). For graph G(n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n), Kn Pn = o(1) and q n = o(1), it holds that P Graph G is not k-connected, but has a minimum degree at least k.
= o(1).
We show that the conditions in Lemma 1 all hold given the conditions of Theorem 1: P n = Ω(n), Kn Pn = o(1) and q n = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n with lim n→∞ α n = α * ∈ (−∞, ∞). To see this, we only need to prove q n = o(1) needed in Lemma 1 follows from the conditions of Theorem 1. Clearly, it holds that |α n | = O(1) from lim n→∞ α n = α * ∈ (−∞, ∞). Then in view of |α n | = O(1) and the fact that k does not scale with n, we obtain from (4) that q n ∼ ln n n ,
which clearly implies q n = o(1).
− P Graph G is not k-connected, but has a minimum degree at least k. , Theorem 1 on k-connectivity of G will be proved once we demonstrate Lemma 2 below on the minimum degree of G.
Lemma 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it holds that
To prove Lemma 2, we first show that the number of nodes in G with a certain degree converges in distribution to a Poisson random variable. With φ h denoting the number of nodes with degree h in G, h = 0, 1, . . ., we use the method of moments to prove that φ h asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ h . Specifically, from [11, Theorem 7] , it follows for any integers h ≥ 0 and ≥ 0 that
Lemma 3. For graph G under the conditions of Theorem 1,
holds for any integers m ≥ 1 and h ≥ 0.
As explained above, Lemma 3 shows (8) with λ h given by (9) . Then the proof of Lemma 2 will be completed once we establish Lemma 3 and the result that (8) implies Lemma 2. Below we will demonstrate that (8) implies Lemma 2, and then detail the proof of Lemma 3.
A. Proving that (8) implies Lemma 2
Recall that φ h denotes the number of nodes with degree h in graph G. With δ defined as the minimum degree of graph G, then the event (δ ≥ k) is the same as k−1 h=0 (φ h = 0) (i.e., the event that no node has a degree falling in {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}). Hence, we obtain
and by the union bound, it holds that
To use (10) and (11), we compute P[φ h = 0] given (8) and thus evaluate λ h specified in (9) . Applying (4) and (7) to (9) , and considering lim n→∞ α n = α * with |α | < ∞, we establish
By (8) and (12), we derive that as n → ∞,
Using (13) in (10) and (11), we obtain P[δ ≥ k] → e − e −α * (k−1)! ; i.e., Lemma 2 is proved.
B. Proving Lemma 3
We use V m to denote the node set {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m }. Lemma 3 evaluates the probability that each of V m has degree h. To compute such probability, we look at whether at least two of V m have an edge in between, and whether at least two of V m have at least one common neighbor. To this end, we define P 1 as the probability of event (each of V m has degree h) ∩ (at least two of V m have an edge in between) ∪ (at least two of V m have at least one common neighbor) , and define P 2 as the probability of event (each of V m has degree h) ∩ (no two of V m have any edge in between) ∩ (no two of V m have any common neighbor). Then P[each of V m has degree h] = P 1 + P 2 . Thus, Lemma 3 will hold once we establish the following two propositions. To prove Propositions 1 and 2, we analyze below how nodes in graph G have edges. We first look at how edges exist between v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m . Recalling C ij as the event that the communication channel between distinct nodes v i and v j is on, we set 1[C ij ] as the indicator variable of event C ij by 1[C ij ]:= 1, if the channel between v i and v j is on, 0, if the channel between v i and v j is off .
We denote by C m a m 2 -tuple consisting of all possible 1[C ij ] with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m as follows: Recalling S i as the key set on node v i , we define a m-tuple T m through T m := (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ). Then we define L m as L m := (C m , T m ). With L m , we have the on/off states of all channels between nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m and the key sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m on these m nodes, so all edges between these m nodes in graph G are determined. Let C m , T m and L m be the sets of all possible C m , T m and L m , respectively. Now we further introduce some notation to characterize how nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m have edges with nodes of V m , where V m denotes {v m+1 , v m+2 , . . . , v n }. Let N i be the neighborhood set of node v i , i.e., the set of nodes that have edges with v i . We also define set N i as the set {v m+1 , v m+2 , . . . , v n } \ N i . Then we are ready to define sets M j1j2...jm for all j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m ∈ {0, 1} which characterize the relationships between sets N i for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. We define M j1j2...jm := i∈{1,2,...,m}:ji=1
In other words, for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, if N i is not empty, each node in N i belongs to M j1j2...jm if j i = 1 and does not belong to M j1j2...jm if j i = 0. Also, if j 1 = j 2 = . . . = j m = 0, then M j1j2...jm = m i=1 N i . The sets M j1j2...jm for j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m ∈ {0, 1} are mutually disjoint, and constitute a partition of the set V m (a partition is allowed to contain empty sets here). By the definition of M j1j2...jm for j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m ∈ {0, 1}, we have j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
and j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:
We further define 2 m -tuple M m through 1 M m = |M j1j2...jm | j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m ∈ {0, 1}
where |M j1j2...jm | means the cardinality of M j1j2...jm . Under event E 2 , the set M m is determined and we denote its value by M
To analyze event E 2 , we define L (19) Now we prove Propositions 1 and 2 based on (18) and (19). The inequality below following from (7) will be applied often: q n ≤ 2 ln n n for all n sufficiently large.
(20)
1) The Proof of Proposition 1
In view of (19) and considering the disjointness of events
We evaluate (21) ≤ n j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:
where E wvt is the event that an edge exists between nodes w and v t . Substituting (25) and (26) into (23), and denoting j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:
|M * j1j2...jm | by Λ, we obtain On the one hand, if L * m / ∈ L (0) m , there exist i 1 and i 2 with 1 ≤ i 1 < i 2 ≤ m such that nodes v i1 and v i2 are neighbors.
m , there exist i 3 and i 4 with
Thus, we have proved (28), which along with (15) 
(29) From (7) , it is true that nq n ∼ ln n, implying nq n > 1 for all n sufficiently large. Then substituting (28) (31) To bound |M m (L * m )|, note that M m is a 2 mtuple. Among the 2 m elements of the tuple, each of |M j1j2...jm | j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:
is at least 0 and at most h; and the remaining element |M 0 m | can be determined by (15) . Then it's straightforward that |M m (L * m )| ≤ (h + 1) 2 m −1 . Using this result in (31), and considering L m = L * m is the union of independent events T m = T * m and C m = C * m , and
From (32) and nq n ∼ ln n → ∞ as n → ∞ by (7) , the proof of Proposition 1 is completed once we show
C. Establishing (33) From (61) and (62) (Lemma 4 in the Appendix), we get
for all n sufficiently large, where S * ij := S * i ∩S * j . With (7) (i.e., q n ∼ ln n n ), we have m 2 nq n 2 = o(1) and mq n = o(1), which are substituted into (34) to induce (33) once we prove 
which together with K n ≤ v ≤ mK n yields 
By [15, Fact 5] and 1 − x ≤ e −x for any real x, it holds that
For n sufficiently large, from p n ≥ n −δ (ln n) −1 and (20) (i.e., q n = p n s n ≤ 2 ln n n ), we have s n = p n −1 q n ≤ p n −1 · 2n −1 ln n ≤ 2n δ−1 (ln n) 2 .
(42) Hence, for n sufficiently large, we apply (41) (42) and P n > 2K n (which holds from the condition Kn Pn = o(1)) to produce Finally, from cases a) and b), for n sufficiently large, H n,m is at most max e m 2 n −δ , e 3m 2 n δ−1 c ln n . Then (35) follows.
V. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We define C 
and
Given that event 1 K p = 0.2 (Simulation) p = 0.2 (Analysis) p = 0.5 (Simulation) p = 0.5 (Analysis) p = 0.8 (Simulation) p = 0.8 (Analysis) P[G(n,K,P,p) is 2-connected.] Fig. 1 .
A plot generated from the simulation and the analysis for the probability that G(n, K, P, p) is 2-connected versus K with n = 2, 000, P = 10, 000 and p = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.
In Figure 1 , we depict the probability that graph G(n, K, P, p) is 2-connected from both the simulation and the analysis, as elaborated below. In all set of experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 2, 000 and the key pool size at P = 10, 000. For the probability p of a communication channel being on, we consider p = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, while varying the parameter K from 3 to 21. For each pair (K, p), we generate 1, 000 independent samples of G(n, K, P, p) and count the number of times that the obtained graphs are 2-connected. Then the counts divided by 1, 000 become the empirical probabilities.
The curves in Figure 1 corresponding to the analysis are determined as follows. We use the asymptotical result to approximate the probability of 2-connectivity in G(n, K, P, p); specifically, given n, K, P, p and k = 2, we determine α by considering p · 1 − P −K K P K = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+α n , a condition stemming from (4) and the computation of q n in Section II, and then use e − e −α (k−1)! as the analytical reference of P[G(n, K, P, p) is 2-connected] for a comparison with the empirical probabilities. Figure 1 indicates that the experimental results are in agreement with our analysis.
VII. RELATED WORK
Random key graphs. For a random key graph G(n, K n , P n ) (viz., Section II) which models the topology induced by the EG scheme, Rybarczyk [7] derives the asymptotically exact probability of connectivity, covering a weaker form of the result -a zero-one law which is also obtained in [1] , [10] . Rybarczyk [8] further establishes a zero-one law for k-connectivity, and we [14] obtain the asymptotically exact probability of kconnectivity. Under P n = Θ(n c ) for some constant c > 1 and
